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Abstract 
In the following paper we investigate how EU law conceptualizes the individual to whom internal 
market regulation is addressed. To this end, we take as an analytical point of departure a stylized 
information paradigm, whereby for reasons of internal market benefits, market players have to bear the 
burden of perceiving and processing information that is relevant in respect of an intended transaction, 
as well as disadvantages should they be ill-equipped to cope with this assignment. We will show that 
although it implemented the normative concept of a well-informed, observant and circumspect 
consumer, the ECJ never adopted such a stylized information paradigm. Moreover, we illustrate 
through various examples how the EU legislature assists market players in perceiving and processing 
information, and even seeks to steer their decision-making process. We reconsider whether or to what 
extent this should be understood as an advancement of an information paradigm or rather as a 
“behavioural turn.” We argue that only a differentiated approach that balances the internal market 
rationale with potentially conflicting rights meets the exigencies of EU law. 
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Homo Economicus, Behavioural Sciences, and Economic Regulation: On the Concept of 
Man in Internal Market Regulation and its Normative Basis 
 
Jens-Uwe Franck & Kai Purnhagen 
Introduction 
Despite of a considerable broadening of its sphere of activity over the last few decades, the project of 
creating a well-functioning internal market still remains a central ambition of the European Union.1 To 
achieve this objective, the Union regulates in various respects market activities, i.e. it seeks to control, 
order or influence the economic behaviour of the internal market players2: Its institutions pass legal 
acts. Internal market related law with a regulatory impact is applied by the European Commission (as 
well as by agencies of the Union) and is construed by the European Court of Justice,3 both of which 
act in close cooperation with Member State institutions and private players.  
Initially referred to in the Lisbon agenda4 and thereafter emphasized by the white paper on new 
governance,5 quality of regulation became a focal point of political and scholarly interest during the 
last few years.6 A recent struggle of the European Commission for “better” and “smarter” regulation 
reflects this development.7  To improve EU governance as a whole and particularly the quality of 
regulation, economic analysis has been assigned a key role. Economic implications and consequences 
of contemplated regulatory acts shall be assessed before any regulatory initiative by the EU.8  “Better 
regulation” is expected to achieve an enhancement of allocative and dynamic efficiency, and therefore 
aims at positive welfare effects.9  
                                                     
1 Article 3(3)1 TFEU. 
2 Cf. the definition of “regulation” adopted by Julia Black, Critical Reflections on Regulation, 27 Australian Journal of Legal 
Philosophy (2002), 1. 
3 Now officially named “Court of Justice of the European Union,” see Section 5, Articles 251 et seq. TFEU. Hereinafter we 
will refer to it as “the Court” or the “ECJ.” 
4 European Council, European Council 23 and 24 March 2000, Lisbon, Presidency Conclusions; Claudio Radaelli, Whither 
better regulation for the Lisbon agenda?, 14 Journal of European Public Policy (2007), 190-207. 
5 European Governance – A white paper, COM(2001) 428 final; see for an assessment David Trubek and Louise Trubek, 
New Governance & Legal Regulation: Complementarity, Rivalry, and Transformation, 13 Columbia Journal of European 
Law (2007), 539-564. 
6 See Claudio Radaelli, Measuring Regulatory Quality? No Thanks (But Why Not?), 3 European Journal of Risk Regulation 
(2012), 108-112. 
7 Cf. Alberto Alemanno, The Better Regulation Initiative at the Judicial Gate: A Trojan Horse within the Commission's Walls 
or the Way Forward?, 15 European Law Journal (2009), 382-400; Lorenzo Allio, On the Smartness of Smart Regulation – 
A Brief Comment on the Future Reform Agenda, 2 European Journal of Risk Regulation (2011), 19-20; Helen McColm, 
Smart Regulation: The European Commission’s Updated Strategy, 2 European Journal of Risk Regulation (2011), 9-11; 
Claudio Radaelli, Whither better regulation for the Lisbon agenda?, 14 Journal of European Public Policy (2007), 190-
207; Jonathan B. Wiener, Better Regulation in Europe, 9 Current Legal Problems (2006), 447-518. 
8 Cf. Mandelkern Group on Better Regulation, Final Report, 13 November 2001, p. 34: “Regulation must be viewed as a 
legal instrument with economic effects carried out through public institutions.” 
9 Cf. Mandelkern Group on Better Regulation, Final Report, 13 November 2001, p. 37: “The review of existing regulation 
should be done […] regarding the effect of existing regulation on innovation, economic growth and employment.” 
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The normative relevance of the latter point is particularly evident with respect to internal market 
regulation. As it was already laid down in the travaux préparatoires to the Treaty of Rome,10 the EU 
law project of an internal market is conceptually based on classical free trade theory.11 First 
formulated by Adam Smith as a theory of absolute advantage, it was David Ricardo who subsequently 
advanced the idea to a theory of comparative advantage12: Even if one assumes that a country was 
more efficient in the production of all goods than another country, both countries would gain by 
trading with each other, as long as they were characterized by different relative efficiencies. That is 
because the former country may gain when it specializes in the production of the good where it has a 
comparative advantage, supposing it may trade that good for other goods whose production it gives 
up. Thus, by removing obstacles for cross-border trade a greater number of transactions will be made 
possible, cooperation and specialization based on a division of labour will be facilitated, and 
competitive pressure will increase. Ideally, this will result in an efficient allocation of production, 
labour and capital, cheaper and better products for all market players in the internal market, and 
ultimately in an enhancement of social welfare.13  
Consequently, the European legislature is called on to ensure that regulatory initiatives that are based 
on the competence of the Union to establish an internal market, and particularly on its competence 
pursuant to Article 114 TFEU, are ultimately apt to indeed reach the efficiency gains that are promised 
by the project of establishing an internal market.14 Although efficiency gains do not constitute the only 
ambition of the internal market, the “efficiency” rationale does in fact form the central means of the 
day-to-day work of regulators in the EU.15 Moreover, in construing internal market law, it is up to the 
ECJ to enforce its economic rationale.16 
Therefore, due to both general considerations on “good regulation” and the economic rationale of 
internal market law, it should be considered unassailable that a state-of-the-art approach to internal 
market regulation requires consideration of economic theory. However, on this basis internal market 
law must not only be conceived as having a de-regulatory function having regard to the theory of 
comparative advantage. Rather, it has to be acknowledged that economic theory has identified 
                                                     
10 Comité Intergouvernemental Créé Par La Conférence De Messine, Rapport Des Chefs De Délégation Aux Ministres Des 
Affaires Etrangères, Doc. MAE 120 f/56 (1956), generally referred to as the “Spaak-Report,” p. 13: “The object of a 
European common market should be to create a vast zone of common economic policy, constituting a powerful unit of 
production and permitting a continuous expansion, an increased stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living 
[…] To attain these objectives, a fusion of the separate markets is an absolute necessity. Through the increased division 
of labor, such a fusion will enable the wasting of resources to be eliminated [...]. In an expanding economy, this division 
of labor is expressed […] by a relatively more rapid development, in the common interest, of the most economic 
production programs. Competitive advantage will, moreover, be determined less and less by natural conditions”; 
translation taken from Joseph J.A. Ellis, Source Material for Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty, 32 Fordham Law Review 
(1963), 247, 249. 
11 See on the historical roots of classical free trade theory Douglas A. Irwin, Against the Tide: An Intellectual History of Free 
Trade, 1996. 
12 David Ricardo, On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, Chapter 7, 1817. 
13 See Willem Molle, The Economics of European Integration, 5th ed. 2006, pp. 35-36 and 67. 
14 This is reflected, e.g., in recital (4) Directive 2007/64/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 
2007 on payment services in the internal market, OJ 2007 L319/1: “It is vital, therefore, to establish at Community level a 
modern and coherent legal framework for payment services […] which is neutral so as to ensure a level playing field for 
all payment systems, in order to maintain consumer choice, which should mean a considerable step forward in terms of 
consumer cost, safety and efficiency, as compared with the present national systems.” 
15 The 2007 survey among EU-25 samples of directors of better regulation came to this conclusion, see Claudio Radaelli and 
F. de Francesco, Regulatory Quality in Europe: Concepts, Measures, and Policy Processes, 2007. 
16 See for an elaborate analysis of the EU’s market-related agenda Ari Afilalo, Dennis Patterson and Kai Purnhagen, 
Statecraft, the Market State and the Development of European Legal Culture, in Geneviéve Helleringer and Kai 
Purnhagen (eds.), Towards a European Legal Culture, forthcoming 2013, who assign to this market-related rationale the 
feature of a distinct European legal culture. 
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categories of so-called market failures that at least in principle may justify (re-)regulation. These 
categories include in particular monopoly power, externalities, and public goods. To give an obvious 
example, in contrast to the days of Adam Smith and David Ricardo,17 the need for antitrust laws is 
uncontested today and thus Articles 101 and 102 TFEU as well as the EC Merger Regulation form an 
essential part of internal market regulation. 
With respect to our topic, it is important to see that while it has for a long time already been standard 
knowledge of microeconomic price theory that for markets to function, market players must obtain 
adequate information on prices and quality of marketed products, it is only since the 1970s that 
economists have started to focus on information deficits as a potential reason for market failure, and 
on possible remedies to counter such risks. George Akerlof famously described in his seminal paper on 
“lemon markets” the mechanism whereby informational deficits on the part of consumers due to 
prohibitively high search costs generate a risk of adverse selection among available products, resulting 
in a failure of the market to provide high quality goods.18 It is basically this theory that provides the 
economic justification to regulate markets if market mechanisms such as signalling through 
advertisement, labelling and other instruments, reputational mechanisms or information 
intermediation,19 do not suffice to provide for an adequate level of product-related information, or 
where market players are rationally ignorant of available information due to prohibitively high costs or 
cognitively inapt to perceive and process available information. There is a broad range of potential 
regulatory remedies available to regulators, reaching from measures to prevent deceptive practices, 
through mandatory information duties to content-related regulation such as, for example, a definition 
of mandatory quality standards.20  
Yet as such (re-)regulatory measures whose justification lies in potential informational deficits may 
themselves establish a restriction on free trade and which, therefore, are subject to legal scrutiny, the 
question has to be raised as to what kind of individual behaviour should be assumed in this regard. 
Neo-classical microeconomic theory assumes a rational human being to whom stable preferences, self-
serving, and transitive behaviour are attributed,21 a model man that is conventionally labelled 
homo economicus.22 Yet insights of different sciences whose interests are dedicated to human 
behaviour like cognitive psychology and behavioural economics have revealed various phenomena of 
cognitive deficits and bounded rationality that are in particular of relevance with regard to perceiving 
and processing information and decision behaviour.23 This has triggered an intra-economic debate on 
                                                     
17 See Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, 1778, p. 160: “People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for 
merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise 
prices. It is impossible indeed to prevent such meetings, by any law which either could be executed, or would be 
consistent with liberty and justice.” 
18 George Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 84 (1970), 488-500; previously, Edward H. Chamberlin, The Product as an Economic Variable, 68 Quarterly 
Journal of Economics (1953), 1, 24-27, had already described the risk of adverse selection due to consumers’ ignorance 
of product quality. 
19 See for an overview on market mechanisms that may counter informational deficits Jens-Uwe Franck, Europäisches 
Absatzrecht, 2006, pp. 190-203. 
20 See for an overview Jens-Uwe Franck, Europäisches Absatzrecht, 2006, pp. 203-216. 
21 The first formulation of the rationale behind the concept of a homo economicus is attributed to John Stuart Mill, Essays on 
Some Unsettled Questions of Political Economy, 2nd ed. 1874, essay 5, paras. 38 and 48. 
22 Klaus Mathis, Efficiency Instead of Justice?, 2009, pp. 7-30. 
23  Early works include Howard Kunreuther and Paul Slovic, Economics, Psychology, and Protective Behavior, 68 American 
Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings (1978), 64-69; Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An 
Analysis of Decision under Risk, 47 Econometrica (1979), 263-291; Robin M. Hogarth, Judgment and Choice, The 
Psychology of Decision, 1980/2nd ed. 1987; Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic and Amos Tversky (eds.), Judgment under 
uncertainty: Heuristics and biases, 1982. An illustrative survey of various insights presents Melvin A. Eisenberg, The 
Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 Stanford Law Review (1995), 211, 216-218. A popular science 
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whether it may be feasible or even imperative to integrate such findings into general microeconomic 
theory. Among economists scepticism seems to be widespread in this regard as they tend to stress an 
inherent tendency of markets to reward rational behaviour while they punish irrationality. Thus, it is 
assumed that those market players who do behave rationally will have a decisive influence on prices, 
quantity, and quality of products and other market parameters.24 Among lawyers and scientists from 
related disciplines, the debate about whether and to what extend findings of behaviour sciences may 
influence regulation is also in full swing. Positions as to a need for their implementation into 
regulatory strategies range from outright rejection25 to limited26 or at least careful27 and full support.28 
Viewed from the position of a regulator who seeks to employ economic expertise, such intra-economic 
controversies and their spill-over to other disciplines must not be ignored. Yet since regulation 
happens within a legal framework, the issue of an individual behaviour model has a normative 
dimension, too. Thus, it may not be regarded as a merely technical aspect of behavioural sciences. It is 
based on this insight and against the background of the important role attributed particularly to 
information economics with respect to internal market regulation that we investigate how positive EU 
law conceptualizes the individual to whom internal market regulation is addressed.  
The Establishment of the Concept of a Well-Informed, Observant and Circumspect 
Internal Market Player and Its Normative Justification 
The idea that information rules might operate less restrictively (but potentially adequately effectively) 
compared to mandatory content-related regulation, and particularly if compared with product bans, is 
an assumption that has been considered in the context of European securities markets regulation 
already in the 1960s.29 This rationale that was later conceptualized as the “information model” of 
internal market law30 gained general importance in the aftermath of the ECJ’s seminal judgment 
“Cassis de Dijon.” In this case, Germany had prohibited the distribution of a French brand of liquor 
since the marketing of fruit liqueurs was subject to the condition of a minimum alcohol content of 25 
percent. The ECJ, interpreting the notion of measures having equivalent effect to quantitative import 
restrictions as it is now laid down in Article 34 TFEU, put forward the argument that the restrictive 
(Contd.)                                                                  
presentation has been produced by Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge, Improving Decisions About Health, 
Wealth, and Happiness, 2008. 
24 Hal R. Varian, Intermediate Microeconomics, 7th ed. 2006, ch. 30.5, pp. 560-561. This point has also been stressed by law-
and-economics scholars such as Alan Schwartz, How Much Irrationality Does the Market Permit?, 37 Journal of Legal 
Studies (2008), 131-159, and Richard Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 Stanford Law 
Review (1998), 1551-1575. 
25 Michael S. Pardo and Dennis Patterson, Philosophical Foundations of Law and Neuroscience, University of Illinois Law 
Review (2010), 1211-1250. 
26 Barbara Bottalico, Risk Communication: Cognitive Neuroscience, Decision Making and the Law, 2 European Journal of 
Risk Regulation (2011), 427-432; Sabine Frerichs, False Promises? A Sociological Critique of the Behavioural Turn in 
Law and Economics, 34 Journal of Consumer Policy (2011), 289-314. 
27 Evan Selinger and Kyle Powys Whyte, Nudging Cannot Solve Complex Policy Problems, 3 European Journal of Risk 
Regulation (2012), 26-31. 
28 Alberto Alemanno, Nudging Smokers The Behavioural Turn of Tobacco Risk Regulation, 3 European Journal of Risk 
Regulation (2012), 32-42; Adam Burgess, “Nudging” Healthy Lifestyles: The UK Experiments with the Behavioural 
Alternative to Regulation and the Market, 3 European Journal of Risk Regulation (2012) 3-16; On Amir and Orly Lobel, 
Liberalism and Lifestyle: Informing Regulatory Governance with Behavioural Research, 3 European Journal of Risk 
Regulation (2012), 17-25; Cass R. Sunstein, Humanizing Cost-Benefit Analysis, 2 European Journal of Risk Regulation 
(2011), 3-7. 
29 Cf. the so-called “Segré-Report,” European Economic Community, The Development of a European Capital Market, 
Report of a Group of experts appointed by the EEC Commission (1966), pp. 225-238; see Thomas Ackermann, Das 
Informationsmodell im Recht der Dienstleistungen, Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht (2009), 230, 237. 
30 Ernst Steindorff, EG-Vertrag und Privatrecht, 1996, p. 195. 
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effect of trade that goes along with such a mandatory requirement may not be justified if the protective 
purpose pursued could be adequately served by providing information to consumers:  
“As the Commission rightly observed, the fixing of limits in relation to the alcohol content of 
beverages may lead to the standardization of products placed on the market and of their 
designations, in the interests of a greater transparency of commercial transactions and offers for 
sale to the public.  
However, this line of argument cannot be taken so far as to regard the mandatory fixing of 
minimum alcohol contents as being an essential guarantee of the fairness of commercial 
transactions, since it is a simple matter to ensure that suitable information is conveyed to the 
purchaser by requiring the display of an indication of origin and of the alcohol content on the 
packaging of products.”31  
Two notions are enshrined in this passage that became essential features of the conceptual debate on 
the regulatory framework for the internal market. This is, first, a dichotomy of “information-related” 
vs. “content-related” rules32 in conjunction with the statement that when a problem has been identified 
as requiring a regulating measure (i.e., it is assumed that market mechanisms alone are insufficient to 
ensure the necessary degree of consumer protection, fairness of competition etc.), preference should be 
given to an information-related rule wherever that seems sufficient to cure the problem.33  
Yet it is essentially the yardstick that is applied to evaluate which regulating means are considered 
sufficient and necessary to reach a legitimate protective objective that ultimately decides on how 
effective this standard really is in respect of its liberalizing, market-opening ratio. In this regard, the 
second noteworthy point in the passage quoted from the judgment in “Cassis de Dijon” comes into 
play, as the ECJ without much ado presumed with regard to the case at hand that the consumers’ 
interests in purchasing products that would correspond to their preferences would be adequately 
served by indicating the alcohol content on a tag.  
Thus, on the one hand the Court assumed on the part of the producer a duty to provide product related 
information and therefore implicitly acknowledged a justification for (re-)regulation to ensure that 
adequate information is provided on the market. In the context of “Cassis de Dijon,” this certainly 
does not seem to be a contentious step as a producer may generally be regarded as being in the 
position to generate such product related information in the most efficient way. On the other hand and 
more remarkably, the ECJ shifted the burden of perceiving and processing information to some extent 
to the consumers. That is because it would save them the time and the trouble to read the small print 
on a tag if the use of a certain label like “fruit liqueur” already indicated a certain (minimum) alcohol 
content. The ECJ’s judgment implicitly involved a trade-off: in order to benefit from lower barriers for 
internal market trade that may entail enhanced competition, lower prices and a broader choice of 
products, one should risk the consequence that a certain number of consumers will suffer a 
                                                     
31 ECJ, 20 February 1979, Case 120/78, REWE v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein, [1979] ECR 649, para. 13. 
32 In fact, the rule of German law in question could be characterized as “information-related” as it was apparently only 
prohibited to market the product under the label “Cassis” or “fruit liqueur.” Viewed in this light, the judgment might be 
interpreted as dismissing one information-related regime as unnecessarily intrusive given the existence of a less intrusive 
but equally effective information based rule. However, in its later case-law the Court considered a domestic prohibition 
of certain publicity markings that were born by a product as an obstacle to intra-Community trade by nature as opposed 
to mere selling arrangements. The Court based this finding on the fact that such rules “may compel the importer to adjust 
the presentation of his products according to the place where they are to be marketed and consequently to incur additional 
packaging and advertising costs,” ECJ, 6 July 1995, Case C-470/93, Verein gegen Unwesen in Handel und Gewerbe 
Köln v Mars, [1995] ECR I-1936, para. 13. Against the background of this reasoning, it seems consequent to characterize 
a rule according to which a certain label may only be used for products that fulfill specified content-requirements as 
“content-related” and not as merely “information-related.”    
33 See John A. Usher, Disclosure Rules (Information) as a Primary Tool in the Doctrine on Measures Having an Equivalent 
Effect, in: Stefan Grundmann, Wolfgang Kerber and Stephen Weatherill (eds.), Party Autonomy and the Role of 
Information in the Internal Market, 2001, 151, 152-153. 
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disadvantage, namely those who are not able or willing to carry the increased burden of information 
perceiving and processing, and who would for example purchase a bottle of “Cassis de Dijon” only to 
realize later that due to the insufficient alcohol content another product would have better served their 
preferences. The Court expects a learning process on the part of these consumers, in the course of 
which they may suffer a material disadvantage. 
In its subsequent case-law, the ECJ more explicitly elaborated on its concept of the consumer as an 
internal market player. In particular, the ECJ had various occasions to judge on the question whether 
certain labels, material or techniques used for commercial communication could be regarded as 
deceptive and therefore, legitimately prohibited by domestic law. In this context, the Court held that 
the deceptive potential of commercial communication must be assessed taking the viewpoint of the 
“average consumer who is reasonably well-informed and reasonably observant and circumspect.”34   
While the ECJ originally developed this concept as an expression of the principle of proportionality 
with regard to the interpretation of the free movement of goods (Article 34 TFEU) and therefore as a 
standard of Union law confining domestic law that establishes obstacles to free trade, subsequently the 
Court also applied the same yardstick to construe which practices may be considered “deceptive” 
under secondary law that aimed at harmonizing domestic protective standards in order to ensure free 
trade in the internal market.35 This spill-over of the consumer concept from the interpretation of a 
fundamental freedom to legislative internal market activities of the Union, that is, from the de-
regulatory to the re-regulatory aspect of internal market law, is consequent first, since the secondary 
internal market legislation follows in principle the same rationale and secondly, because it has to be 
regarded as settled law that not just the national legislatures but also the institutions of the Union are 
bound by the fundamental freedoms.36  
It is against the background of this case-law that authors such as Steindorff,37 Weatherill,38 and 
Wilhelmsson39 posited in the context of the internal market the concept of a confident consumer as an 
antithesis to the concept of a weak and vulnerable consumer, and Steindorff developed what has later 
been labelled the “information paradigm” of internal market law.40 According to this notion, as the 
internal market is characterized by differentiated and fragmented conditions, it might only operate 
effectively to the benefit of all market players and to the society as a whole if the consumers who were 
on the one hand enriched with a wider choice of products had, on the other hand, to bear the burden of 
perceiving and processing information which was relevant to decide which product actually could 
meet their preferences. That is, in the internal market context, consumer protection and unfair 
competition law had to be interpreted instrumentally and hence, reconciled with the normative 
                                                     
34 The ECJ has consistently used this wording since its judgment of 16 July 1998, Case C-210/96, Gut Springenheide and 
Tusky v Oberkreisdirektion Steinfurt, [1998] ECR I-4657, para. 37. Prior to this decision the Court had already referred 
to the “[r]easonably circumspect consumer” as yardstick, ECJ, 6 July 1995, Case C-470/93, Verein gegen Unwesen in 
Handel und Gewerbe Köln v Mars, [1995] ECR, I-1923, para. 13: “Reasonably circumspect consumers may be deemed 
to know that there is not necessarily a link between the size of publicity markings relating to an increase in a product’s 
quantity and the size of that increase.” 
35 ECJ, 2 February 1994, Case C-315/92, Verband Sozialer Wettbewerb v Clinique Laboratories and Estée Lauder, [1994] 
ECR I-317, para. 16; ECJ, 28 January 1999, Case C-77/97, Österreichische Unilever v Smithkline Beecham 
Markenartikel, [1999] ECR I-431, para. 27; ECJ, 24 October 2002, Case C-99/01, Linhart and Biffl, [2002] ECR I-9375, 
para. 26. 
36 ECJ, 9 August 1994, Case C-51/93, Meyhui v Schott Zwiesel Glaswerke, [1994] ECR I-3879, para. 11. 
37 Ernst Steindorff, EG-Vertrag und Privatrecht, 1996, pp. 195-196.  
38 See Stephen Weatherill, The evolution of European consumer law: from well informed consumer to confident consumer, 
in Hans-W. Micklitz (ed.), Rechtseinheit oder Rechtsvielfalt in Europa?, 1996, 423-440. 
39 Thomas Wilhelmsson, Social Contract Law and European Integration, 1995, pp. 145-146. 
40 The notion of an “information model” in the internal market context has subsequently been taken up by several authors, 
see inter alia the articles in Stefan Grundmann, Wolfgang Kerber and Stephen Weatherill (eds.), Party Autonomy and the 
Role of Information in the Internal Market, 2001. 
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objectives to foster free trade and the integration of the national markets. Thus, protection against 
deceptive practices, for instance, must not take the ignorant consumer as a yardstick since such an 
approach would ultimately require the prescription of uniform products.41 By and large it shall be 
considered sufficient to ensure for reasons of consumer protection free access to information which 
might be relevant for a rational transaction decision. 
To argue along the lines of an information paradigm in a pure form would imply a model of a “smart 
and decent” internal market player who did not suffer from capacity constraints or mental defects or 
biases in perceiving and processing data, and who realized market transactions based on available 
information, rationally balancing pros and cons and being aware of their own preferences.42 It is 
precisely such an ideal of an internal market player that shares essential features with the concept of a 
homo economicus, and which presupposes a rational and self-interested actor who has the ability to 
make judgments towards their subjectively defined ends.  
Though the early protagonists of an information paradigm for internal market regulation could not yet 
appreciate the insights of cognitive psychology, behavioural economics or other disciplines on 
characteristics of human behaviour, as they were taken up only during the last decade or so by legal 
writers, they were certainly not naïve as to the realities of consumers’, investors’ or other market 
players’ individual capacity to process information and to reach rational decisions on that basis. 
Steindorff, for instance, made it clear that his concept had to be understood as a normative one when 
he wrote that the internal market “demanded” a circumspect consumer. It is for the sake of internal 
market integration that market players should bear the burden of perceiving and processing 
information, and also the drawbacks that may follow should they carry out a market transaction 
suffering a cognitive deficit.43 
The ECJ’s concept of a “reasonably well-informed and reasonably observant and circumspect” 
consumer has to be regarded as a normative one, too. This insight is supported by the fact that the ECJ 
on various occasions denied the deceptive potential of commercial communication without 
considering its actual perception by the addressees in question.44 This has led to the persistent 
conclusion among some scholars according to which consumer protection in the EU was categorical in 
the sense that “[w]hoever falls under the definition is entitled to protection, and to the same degree.”45  
A closer look at EU consumer law in action discloses quite the contrary46: It is essential to see that the 
ECJ in its interpretation of prohibitions of deceptive practices did not adopt an information paradigm 
in a pure sense, shifting the burden of perceiving and processing information generally and entirely 
onto the individual market player. This is in particular reflected by the use of the attribute 
“reasonably” in the aforementioned phrase, which leaves the door open to a differentiated yardstick. 
                                                     
41 AG Capotorti, 16 January 1979, Case 120/78, Rewe v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein, [1979] ECR 666, 673: 
“But the idea of this widespread, if not general, incapacity on the part of the consumer seems to me to doom to failure 
any effort to protect him, unless it be to impose upon him a single national product the composition of which is constant 
and is rigorously controlled.” 
42 Cf. Thomas Wilhelmsson, Social Contract Law (1994), 145-146: “[…] one can claim that the consumer model prevailing 
in the Community is a well-informed and well-to-be-informed consumer – the active internal market consumer – who can 
and should decide on his own affairs and at his own risk.” 
43 Ernst Steindorff, EG-Vertrag und Privatrecht, 1996, pp. 195-196. 
44 ECJ, 13 December 1990, Case C-238/89, Pall, [1990] ECR I-4827, paras. 18-21; ECJ, 2 February 1994, Case C-315/92, 
Verband Sozialer Wettbewerb v Clinique Laboratories and Estée Lauder, [1994] ECR I-317, paras. 19-23; ECJ, 4 April 
2000, Case C-465/98, Darbo, [2000] ECR I-3397, paras. 21-34; ECJ, 24 October 2002, Case C-99/01, Linhart and Biffl, 
[2002] ECR I-9375, paras. 31-35. 
45 Martijn Hesselink, European Contract Law: A Matter of Consumer Protection, Citizenship, or Justice?, 15 European 
Review of Private Law (2007), 323, 327. 
46 See Wulf-Henning Roth, Freier Dienstleistungsverkehr und Verbraucherschutz, Verbraucher und Recht (2007), 161, 163-
164; in general on European consumer law Stephen Weatherill, Consumer Protection under EU law “is not absolute”: 
yes, but be careful!, 8 European Review of Contract Law (2012), 221-233. 
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Thus, it has been recognized by the ECJ that the level of attention (normatively) expected from a 
consumer may “vary according to the category of goods or services in question.”47 Moreover, the 
Court submitted that its concept of a “reasonably well-informed and reasonably observant and 
circumspect” consumer would not apply in contexts where a “mistake as to the product’s 
characteristics [may] pose any risk to public health.”48 That is, in defining whether a piece of 
commercial communication has to be considered deceptive, the Court takes into account normative 
considerations such as “public health” which may conflict with an internal market rationale.  
The Information Paradigm and the Individual Cognitive and Behaviour Concept behind 
(Secondary) Internal Market Law 
The Internal Market Rationale Pro-Choice: Harmonization of Information-Related Regulation 
May Supersede Harmonization of Product Standards 
The message delivered by the ECJ in “Cassis de Dijon” according to which a wide choice of products 
should be available to the benefit of all internal market players, and hence, protective purposes like 
consumer protection, fairness of competition etc. should as far as possible be addressed by 
information-related rules rather than by content-related rules, affected also the focus of secondary 
internal market regulation. It encouraged the internal market legislature to seek to foster free product 
trade based on a harmonization of information-related rules, largely waiving ambitions to harmonize 
product specifications.49 Therefore, it does not come as a surprise that a large bulk of secondary 
internal market law may be characterized as information-related: mandatory information requirements 
for producers and dealers, regulation of various instruments of commercial communication 
(advertisement, labelling, brochures), withdrawal rights, as well as rules on information intermediaries 
such as insurance agents and brokers. To this end, for example recital (21) of Directive 2003/71/EC 
(Prospectus Directive)50 stipulates that “[i]nformation is a key factor in investor protection.” Recital 
(18) of the Prospectus Directive becomes even more concrete: “The provision of full information 
concerning securities and issuers of those securities promotes, together with rules on the conduct of 
business, the protection of investors.”  
It is in accord with the internal market rationale that information-related regulation may to a large 
degree supersede content-related regulation as a mechanism to protect the interests of consumers, 
investors and other market players. That is, the internal market legislature has taken up the ECJ’s 
reasoning in “Cassis de Dijon” whereby the Court indicated its acceptance to some extent of a lower 
level of consumer protection in order to harvest the benefits of an enlarged market with lower barriers 
to free trade, enhanced competition and a wider choice of available products. This “trade-off” rationale 
is partly reflected in the reasoning for secondary internal market legislation, though expressed in a 
euphemistic way, such as in recital (52) Life Insurance Directive51 which stipulates that “[i]n an 
internal market for assurance the consumer will have a wider and more varied choice of contracts. If 
he/she is to profit fully from this diversity and from increased competition, he/she must be provided 
                                                     
47 Cf. ECJ, 22 June 1999, Case C-342/97, Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer v Klijsen Handel, [1999] ECR I-3819, para. 26. 
48 ECJ, 13 January 2000, Case C-220/98, Estée Lauder, [2000] ECR I-117, para. 28; see also ECJ, 24 October 2002, Case C-
99/01, Linhart and Biffl, [2002] ECR I-9375, para. 31. 
49 See Stefan Grundmann, Wolfgang Kerber and Stephen Weatherill, Party Autonomy and the Role of Information in the 
Internal Market – An Overview, in: Stefan Grundmann, Wolfgang Kerber and Stephen Weatherill (eds.), Party Autonomy 
and the Role of Information in the Internal Market (2001), 3, 7. 
50 Directive 2003/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 on the prospectus to be 
published when securities are offered to the public and admitted to trading, OJ 2003 L 345/64. 
51 Directive 2002/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 November 2002 concerning life assurance, OJ 
2002 L 345/1.  
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with whatever information is necessary to enable him/her to choose the contract best suited to his/her 
needs.”  
Hence, seen against the background of the dichotomy of “information-related” vs. “content-related” 
rules, it is correct to state that secondary internal market law is dominated by an “information 
paradigm,” as indeed a large part of market-related rules aims at ensuring that a sufficient degree of 
(correct) product information is provided on the market, assuming that market mechanisms alone are 
insufficient to ensure an efficient generation of transaction relevant information. Certainly, a 
considerable number of content-related internal market rules exists nevertheless, which are either 
designed as direct top-down regulation, such as the prohibition of certain chemical substances in 
Article 56 Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 (hereinafter REACH),52 or incentives-regulation such as in 
the “new approach” Directives.53 However, conceptually this regulatory approach represents an 
exception that is mainly reduced to the role of a protective mechanism where crucial individual rights 
such as the individual health of a market player is at stake but not if the regulated market behaviour 
may affect merely financial interests. That is the reason why, for example, Article 3 Tobacco Products 
Directive54 stipulates maximum tar, nicotine and carbon monoxide yields. 
The general internal market rationale “permit but inform” in favour of enhanced competition and a 
wide product choice, as it is also reflected in secondary legislation, entails the basic normative 
assumption that market players are smart enough to cope with a large diversity of products given that 
the regulator ensures through various information-related instruments that sufficient information is 
available on the market that enables them to make transactions that meet their preferences. Yet it is 
important to see with regard to the individual cognitive and behaviour concept behind such an 
information-focused regulatory strategy that a general orientation in favour of pro-choice neither 
presumes a decision whereby the burden of perceiving and processing information is entirely left on 
the individual market player, nor that the legislature had to abstain from any attempt to steer 
transaction decisions in certain directions.  
We will show that a stylized information paradigm according to which the internal market player has 
to carry the full burden of information processing has actually never been realized in internal market 
law. Rather, the selection and weighting of information by the legislature and his choice on how it has 
to be made accessible to the market players has always taken a certain part of the burden of 
information processing from the individual market player. As the following paragraphs reveal, the 
internal market legislature is first of all indeed sensitive to the needs of market players who are 
particularly vulnerable, secondly, it seeks in many respects to facilitate information processing on the 
part of the market players, and thirdly, it strives to influence market players’ decision-reaching, partly 
even strategically following a certain political agenda. 
Acknowledging Individual Weaknesses: Protecting Particularly Vulnerable Market Players 
Granting specific protection to market players who are particularly vulnerable has been accepted by 
the ECJ as a legitimate restriction on trade. In “Buet” the ECJ accepted a French ban on canvassing for 
the purpose of selling educational material on the grounds that  
                                                     
52 Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 concerning the 
Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH) and establishing a European Chemicals 
Agency, OJ 2006, L 136/3. 
53 The standard example is Directive 2001/104/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 December 2001 
concerning medical devices, OJ 2002, L 6/50. See on the EU’s new approach regulation Christopher Hodges, European 
Regulation of Consumer Product Safety, 2005, pp. 22-25, where Hodges provides a list of new approach legislation. 
54 Directive 2001/37/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2001 on the approximation of the laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning the manufacture, presentation and sale of 
tobacco products, OJ 2001 L 194/26. 
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“[t]he potential purchaser often belongs to a category of people who, for one reason or another, are 
behind with their education and are seeking to catch up. That makes them particularly vulnerable 
when faced with salesmen of educational material who attempt to persuade them that if they use 
that material they will have better employment prospects.”55  
The Court considered a prohibition on direct marketing a proportionate protective mechanism since 
“an ill-considered purchase could cause the purchaser harm other than mere financial loss that could 
be longer lasting.”56 Though it remains an exception to the general consumer concept in internal 
market context57, there are various examples in secondary internal market regulation, too, which 
illustrate that consideration has been given to the needs of particularly vulnerable market players. This 
demonstrates that in such contexts neither the ECJ nor the internal market legislature expects a 
learning process on the part of these individuals that may entail disadvantages for them. 
Particularly vulnerable consumers 
As a cornerstone of secondary internal market law, the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive58 
establishes uniform rules on commercial communication and marketing activities at the Union level, 
thereby, creating a level playing field for businesses, and facilitating them in exercising their internal 
market freedoms. The regulatory approach that has been implemented through the Directive may be 
characterized by three elements: market transparency and freedom of choice and decision-making for 
consumers.59 Pursuant to Article 5(2)(b) of the Directive, a commercial practice shall be unfair if “it 
materially distorts […] the economic behaviour with regard to the product of the average consumer 
whom it reaches or to whom it is addressed […].” As explained in recital (18), this has to be 
understood as a reference to the concept of the “reasonably well-informed and reasonably observant 
and circumspect” consumer as it was shaped in the ECJ’s jurisprudence.60  
Yet Article 5(3) of the Directive requires a special protection of consumers “who are particularly 
vulnerable to a commercial practice or the underlying product because of their mental or physical 
infirmity, age or credulity” as the unfairness of the commercial practice in question “shall be assessed 
from the perspective of the average member of that group.” However, this stricter yardstick applies 
only if a commercial practice is “likely to materially distort the economic behaviour only of a clearly 
identifiable group of consumers.” Therefore, it is restricted to instances where the practice is 
particularly addressed at such a group, for example if its presentation is especially appealing to 
children.61  Moreover, the exceptional character of this provision is further emphasized through the 
restrictive indication whereby “[t]his is without prejudice to the common and legitimate advertising 
practice of making exaggerated statements or statements which are not meant to be taken literally.” 
                                                     
55 ECJ, 16 May 1989, Case 382/87, Buet and another v Ministère public, [1989] ECR 1235, para. 13. 
56 Ibid. para. 14.  
57 See Geraint Howells and Thomas Wilhelmsson, 28 European Law Review (2003), 370, 381: “The protection of the weak 
and vulnerable consumers has probably never been very high on the agenda of Community law.“ 
58 Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-
consumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 
98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (“Unfair Commercial Practices Directive”), OJ 
L 149/22, 2005. 
59 Cf. Hans-W. Micklitz, in Hans-W. Micklitz, Norbert Reich and Peter Rott (eds.), Understanding EU Consumer Law, 2009, 
p. 71. 
60 Recital (18): “In line with the principle of proportionality, and to permit the effective application of the protections 
contained in it, this Directive takes as a benchmark the average consumer, who is reasonably well-informed and 
reasonably observant and circumspect […] as interpreted by the Court of Justice […].” 
61 There is no need to say that it is far from obvious where one should draw the line in those cases, cf. Hans-W. Micklitz, in 
Hans-W. Micklitz, Norbert Reich and Peter Rott (eds.), Understanding EU Consumer Law, 2009, p. 88. 
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In the same vein, recital (34) of the Directive on Consumer Rights62 requires traders to “take into 
account the specific needs of consumers who are particularly vulnerable” when providing information. 
Recital (34) then further defines these groups as “consumers who are particularly vulnerable because 
of their mental, physical or psychological infirmity, age or credulity.” 
Minors 
In order to protect minors,63 Article 9(1)(e) Audiovisual Media Services Directive64 prohibits 
commercial communication for alcoholic beverages that is aimed specifically at minors. Moreover, 
Article 9(1)(g) of the Directive stipulates that “commercial communications shall not cause physical 
or moral detriment to minors,” and therefore “they shall not directly exhort minors to buy or hire a 
product or service by exploiting their inexperience or credulity, directly encourage them to persuade 
their parents or others to purchase the goods or services being advertised, exploit the special trust 
minors place in parents, teachers or other persons, or unreasonably show minors in dangerous 
situations.” 
Sick persons 
People who are suffering from a disease are considered particularly susceptible to alluring 
advertisement messages, and might tend to make spontaneous decisions that actually contradict their 
own preferences. To work against such risks, various rules restrict commercial communication that 
attributes to food the property of preventing, treating or curing a human disease,65 and even prohibit 
commercial communication for medicinal products and medical treatment available only on 
prescription.66  
Recognizing Individual Cognitive Constraints: Regulative Activities to Facilitate Information 
Processing 
Internal market regulation makes ample use of regulatory techniques that have as their object and 
effect to facilitate market players in perceiving and processing information. It is the basic concept of 
these rules to reduce effort and costs that have to be borne by a market player who seeks to make a 
rational, information-based transaction decision. This finding indicates that the internal market 
legislature does indeed take into account individual cognitive constraints and deficits in this respect, 
and does not just rely on market mechanisms to overcome these problems. 
                                                     
62 Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on consumer rights, amending 
Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing 
Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, OJ L 304/64, 2011. 
63 See on the need of the protection of minors in their role as consumers Lodewijk Pessers, Refining the legal approach 
towards the underage consumer: A process still in its infancy, 3 Journal of Intellectual Property, Information Technology 
and E-Commerce Law (2012), 2-11. 
64 Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2010 on the coordination of certain 
provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of 
audiovisual media services, OJ 2010 L 95/1. 
65 See e.g. Article 6(2) Directive 2002/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 June 2002 on the 
approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to food supplements, OJ 2002 L 183/51; Article 8 Directive 
2009/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 on foodstuffs intended for particular 
nutritional uses (recast), OJ 2009 L 124/21. 
66 Article 9(1)(f) Audiovisual Media Services Directive. 
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Rules on the way information has to be presented 
There is a multitude of rules requiring that information is provided in a transparent way. To take an 
example from labelling law, Article 6(1) Cosmetic Products Directive67 provides that information on 
the container and on the packaging is given “in indelible, easily legible and visible lettering.” An 
investment company has to include in its prospectus an explanation of the fund’s risk profile which is 
“clear and easily understandable.”68 Pursuant to Article 10(1) Directive on electronic commerce69 
mandatory information has to be provided “clearly, comprehensibly and unambiguously.” 
The language of provided information is an essential factor of how much effort a market player has to 
put into perceiving information. Various language-related rules ensure that provided information is 
accessible to the addressee. For example, it is required according to Article 4(3) Timeshare Directive70 
that owed information “is drawn up in the language […] of the Member State in which the consumer is 
resident or a national, at the choice of the consumer, provided it is an official language of the 
Community.” 
Standardization makes it easier for market players to compare prices and other product-related 
information. Exemplary in this respect is the requirement that traders have to indicate not only the 
selling price but also the price per unit of measurement.71 To pick up another example, the mandatory 
nutrition declaration has to include information on the energy value that shall be expressed per 100 g 
or per 100 ml.72  
Weighting of information signals which pieces of information are presumably the most relevant, and 
thus may facilitate a rational application of the limited resources of market players to perceive and 
process information in preparation of a transaction decision. A requirement of a specific sequential 
arrangement of data, for instance, entails a formal weighting of the provided information. Article 
6(1)(g) Cosmetic Products Directive, for example, requires that the packaging includes “a list of 
ingredients in descending order of weight.” A substantive form of weighting comes along with an 
outspoken classification of information, for instance if certain information has to be characterized as 
an “Important Notice,” e.g. in accordance with Article 13(4) Infant Formulae Directive,73 or even as a 
“warning,” e.g. pursuant to Article 6(3)(c) Food Supplements Directive74 or Article 19(5) Markets in 
Financial Instruments Directive.75   
                                                     
67 Council Directive 76/768/EEC of 27 July 1976 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to cosmetic 
products, OJ 1976 L 262/169. 
68 Article 69(1) Directive 2009/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on the coordination of 
laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to undertakings for collective investment in transferable 
securities (UCITS) (recast), OJ 2009 L 302/32. 
69 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of 
information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market, OJ 2000 L 178/1. 
70 Directive 2008/122/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 January 2009 on the protection of consumers 
in respect of certain aspects of timeshare, long-term holiday product, resale and exchange contracts, OJ 2009 L 33/10. 
71 Article 3 Directive 98/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 1998 on consumer protection in 
the indication of the prices of products offered to consumers, OJ 1998 L 80/27. 
72 Article 32(2) Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on the 
provision of food information to consumers, OJ 2011 L 304/18. 
73 Commission Directive 2006/141/EC of 22 December 2006 on infant formulae and follow-on formulae and amending 
Directive 1999/21/EC, OJ 2006 L 401/1. 
74 Directive 2002/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 June 2002 on the approximation of the laws on 
the Member States relating to food supplements, OJ 2002 L 183/51. 
75 Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on markets in financial instruments, 
OJ 2004, L 145/1. 
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Regulation of information intermediaries 
Internal market law includes detailed rules on insurance mediation76 and investment firms77 by means 
of which the legislature attributes to insurance and investment agents and brokers the function to serve 
as information intermediaries.78 The need for regulation in these fields rests upon the assumption that 
first, the individual customer or investor is unable to cope with the amounts of information that has to 
be provided to the markets by insurance companies, issuers of securities, investment companies etc. 
and secondly, that market mechanisms including mechanisms of information intermediation are not 
sufficient to make up for these deficits. Both assumptions are well-founded.79  
It should be pointed out that the establishment of single European insurance and investment markets 
had a strong liberalizing and deregulating impact. As a consequence, the range of available financial 
instruments – that due to their character as complex experience or credence goods, respectively,80 
entail high information asymmetries and search costs anyway – has significantly widened. Internal 
market regulation to strengthen the role of information intermediaries has to be understood against this 
background,81 and fits into an internal market rationale which on the one hand accepts a trade-off 
between higher financial risks on the part of consumers and investors caused by increasing 
information problems and positive welfare effects through an enlarged market, but on the other hand 
seeks by way of various regulative mechanisms to counter these risks of information deficits, though 
as far as possible without restricting the choice of products generated by the internal market in the first 
place. 
Steering the Process of Decision-Making: Explicit and Implicit Paternalism 
 Where a regulator does not only assist market players in ensuring the informational basis to find an 
informed transaction decision, but where it also seeks to influence the content of that decision in their 
best interest, such a regulatory impact may be considered “paternalistic.” The finding of phenomena of 
bounded rationality through the behavioural sciences seems to have opened up a leeway for regulators 
to engage in what has been dubbed “libertarian paternalism.”82 Thus, steering the individual process of 
decision making in a certain direction might be regarded as legitimate on the grounds that individual 
market players have to be assisted in reaching a decision that meets their preferences or that they have 
to be prevented from acting irrationally against their own best interest, respectively.  
This line of argument may be employed on the one hand to give reason to content-related regulation, 
e.g. to justify a prohibition of potentially dangerous products. On the other hand, it may also 
                                                     
76 Directive 2002/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 December 2002 on insurance mediation, OJ 
2003 L 9/3. 
77 Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on markets in financial instruments, 
OJ 2004, L 145/1. 
78 Jens-Uwe Franck, Europäisches Absatzrecht, 2006, pp. 305-319. 
79 See e.g. the law-and-economics analysis by Stefan Grundmann and Wolfgang Kerber, Information Intermediaries and 
Party Autonomy – The Example of Securities and Insurance Markets, in Stefan Grundmann, Wolfgang Kerber and 
Stephen Weatherill (eds.), Party Autonomy and the Role of Information in the Internal Market, 2001, pp. 264-310. 
80 The term “experience good” has been established by Philip Nelson, Information and Consumer Behavior, 78 Journal of 
Political Economy (1970), 311-329, to characterize products whose quality can hardly be observed in advance but only 
upon consumption. Michael R. Darby and Edi Karni, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud, 16 Journal of 
Law and Economics (1973), 67, 68-69, introduced the concept of “credence goods” for goods whose quality consumers 
may not judge even after they consumed them.  
81 Cf. recital (2) Markets in Financial Instruments Directive: “In recent years more investors have become active in the 
financial markets and are offered an even more complex wide-ranging set of services and instruments.” 
82 Cf. Cass R. Sunstein and Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 University of Chicago Law 
Review (2003), 1159-1202. 
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substantiate regulatory techniques that, while they influence the decision-making process of market 
players in a certain direction, e.g. through the selection or the way of presentation of information that 
has to be provided to them, technically preserve an individually free product choice and which 
therefore have to be considered to be less intrusive than a content-related regulation. As may be 
demonstrated by the following examples taken from internal market regulation, the manipulative and 
thus paternalistic facet of such regulatory interventions may be more or less pronounced.   
Warnings against tobacco products 
Article 5 Tobacco Products Directive requires that both a general and an additional warning against 
the damaging effects of smoking are printed on each unit packet of tobacco products and that these 
warnings have to cover not less than 30 and 40 per cent, respectively, of the external area of the 
surface of the packet. The language of these warnings is at least in part highly suggestive (“Smoking 
can cause a slow and painful death”83). Member states may require additional warnings in the form of 
colour photographs and other illustrations. These may be chosen from a library of 42 pictorial health 
warnings designed by the Commission. Several of these images appear to be quite shocking to an 
observer.84  
The way the information on the health risks of smoking has to be presented to potential purchasers 
illustrates that the objective of this regulative measure goes beyond enabling consumers to make an 
informed transaction decision. Rather, it is the obvious agenda to prevent them from purchasing a – 
perfectly legal – product. Tobacco regulation aims at affecting social habits, even if regulation comes 
in the guise of information.85 Pursuant to its legitimizing assumption, people who smoke do so 
contrary to their own preferences. This implies that if only they had sufficient inner strength they 
would certainly keep their hands off tobacco products. Thus, tobacco regulation conceptualizes the 
consumer as a person who even if informed about the health risks of a product is not able to act 
according to their own best interest.  
Notice in favour of breast feeding 
Article 13 Directive 2006/141/EC86 permits the marketing of infant formulae only if its label contains 
inter alia “a statement to the effect that the product is suitable for particular nutritional use by infants 
from birth when they are not breast fed,” and if the labelling bears under the headline “Important 
Notice” a statement concerning the superiority of breast feeding. On the one hand such a notice 
informs addressees about the suitability of feeding infants with the respective product but that breast-
feeding is in general considered to be a preferable way of feeding them. On the other hand, such a 
requirement aims not only at enabling consumers to make an informed decision. The statement 
contains a judgment, and the obvious purpose is to bring mothers of infants to consider the purchase of 
the product only as a second class option.  
Though the promotion of breast feeding might be fairly uncontroversial,87 the example demonstrates 
that a requirement to provide a certain piece of information necessarily entails a paternalistic facet that 
                                                     
83 Annex I no. 9 Tobacco Products Directive.  
84 See http://ec.europa.eu/health/tobacco/law/pictorial/index_en.htm. 
85 See Alberto Alemanno, Nudging Smokers The Behavioural Turn of Tobacco Risk Regulation, 3 European Journal of Risk 
Regulation (2012), 32-42. 
86 Commission Directive 2006/141/EC of 22 December 2006 on infant formulae and follow-on formulae and amending 
Directive 1999/21/EC, OJ 2006 L 401/1. 
87 But see on potential negative effects of breastfeeding promotion Ellie Lee, Health, morality, and infant feeding: British 
mothers’ experience of formula milk use in the early weeks, Sociology of Health & Illness 29 (2007), 1075-1090. 
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becomes particularly apparent where the information in question has to be particularly emphasized and 
where it not only concerns product related data, but also normative statements.   
Formal weighting of required information 
To require a weighting of information according to a formal and therefore, apparently neutral criterion 
such as, for example, the aforementioned listing of “ingredients in descending order of weight” 
pursuant to Article 6(1)(g) Cosmetic Products Directive, is not entirely free of a paternalistic element: 
As higher-ranked pieces of information are more likely to be perceived by consumers, the rule may 
provoke a situation where ingredients with a higher weighting may be more influential on the decision 
to purchase the product in question.  
Though this effect might be fairly weak, it shows that there is no such thing as a purely neutral, 
absolutely non-paternalistic way to select and present information. Every regulatory choice as to 
which information has to be provided and how it has to be provided is necessarily accompanied by an 
element of paternalism, if only as a matter of fact, as the regulatory decision may not be based on a 
determined agenda to steer decision-making of information addressees in a certain direction. 
Defining a required method of access to information 
As may be illustrated using the example of information distribution in respect of chemical substances, 
the prescribed path by which a piece of information has to be disseminated carries some potential to 
steer behaviour more or less effectively in a certain direction. Any chemical substance within the 
scope of REACH and beyond the amount of 1t requires labelling in accordance with Articles 5, 6, 
10(a)(iv), Section 4 of Annex VI REACH, Regulation 1272/2008 (CLP-Regulation) in order to be fit 
for marketing. Articles 77(2)(e) and 119 REACH stipulate the availability of these labels on the 
internet. The labelling requirements shall enable the addressee to evaluate directly the dangers 
involved in the use of the substance. Additionally, according to the principle of substitution, it shall 
enable the addressee to assess which substance could be used that results in less harm but has the same 
effect. In other words: It shall enable the users at the moment they intend to use the substance to assess 
how to handle it safely.  
However, if the very same substance is (only) part of an article, is not intended to be released, and the 
European Chemical Agency did not request special labelling according to Article 7(5) REACH, 
pursuant to Article 33 REACH the information on how to handle the risks involved with the substance 
must be made available only on the special request of the consumer. The same information aimed at 
the safe use of a substance is therefore directly available in the case that the addressee is directly 
exposed to the substance, whereas when the same substance is contained in an article, the information 
is regularly only available on the request of the consumer.  
Obviously, users of a substance may much more easily observe a warning that is issued on the 
container of a substance than if they have actively to ask for it. It follows that the EU lawmaker 
refrains from imposing the burden to access information on users that are directly exposed to a 
substance. They hence need to deal with the processing of information only. In contrast, consumers of 
articles which contain certain chemicals even carry the burden of accessing information about the 
dangerousness of the substances in question. 
A Brief Summary 
Secondary internal market regulation has implemented and perpetuated the concept laid down in the 
ECJ’s decision in “Cassis de Dijon” according to which information-related regulation should be 
given preference over content-related regulation if the former has to be considered sufficient in the 
light of the protective purpose of the regulation. Assessing this point, one has to accept a trade-off 
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between higher financial risks on the part of consumers and investors caused by increasing 
information problems and positive welfare effects through an enlarged market. Thus, the internal 
market legislature has adopted the concept of a “well-informed, observant and circumspect” consumer. 
However, the implementation of such a concept does not mean that an individual market player has to 
bear entirely the burden of information processing. Rather, internal market law considers individual 
cognitive limits and seeks to counter the risks of information deficits through various regulative 
mechanisms, though as far as possible without restricting the widened choice of products generated by 
the internal market in the first place.  
While it remains in general the freedom of the individual market players to decide which transaction 
may correspond to their preferences, we may also find rules such as the required warnings against 
smoking tobacco that cannot anymore be understood as aiming merely at enabling consumers to reach 
an informed transaction decision, but that follow an explicit political agenda and seek to steer 
transaction decisions in this direction, though technically without restricting free product choice.  
However, such instances where the consumer is conceptualized as a person who is not able to act 
according to their own best interest remains exceptional, and hence, it would be misleading to 
postulate a “behavioural turn” in internal market policy. Yet it is important to recognize that every 
regulatory choice on which information has to be provided on the market and in which form it has to 
be provided involves an element of paternalism as it influences the informational basis that may 
establish the grounds for the decision-making process of market players. Thus, any rule that is meant 
only to facilitate perceiving and processing information contains a “behavioural facet,” if only 
implicitly or as a matter of fact rather than intention, and weak in its nature. 
Normative Requirements with respect to the Individual Cognitive and Behaviour 
Concept to Adopt for Internal Market Regulation 
In this section we will discuss how the normative concept of a market player as an addressee of 
internal market regulation is shaped by requirements of EU primary law. The fundamental freedoms as 
the paramount legal instruments to implement the internal market (Article 26(2) TFEU) establish a 
normative basis in this regard. Consequently, the idea of an internal market player as a “well-
informed, observant and circumspect,” i.e. roughly speaking as a “smart and decent fellow” who 
shares essential features with the concept of a homo economicus serves as a basic model. Yet this line 
of reasoning may not explain the protective impetus and the “behavioural facet” we also may observe 
with regard to the normative idea of the internal market player as it becomes apparent considering 
internal-market legislation and the adjudication of the ECJ. We will argue that the rationale behind this 
normative dimension may be attributed to an increasing consideration of individual, non-market 
related rights enshrined particularly in the fundamental rights as part of EU primary law.   
On The Normative Basis of a Regulatory Image of the Internal Market Player as a “Smart and 
Decent Fellow” 
The concept of the internal market as embodied in the Treaties first and foremost aims at enhancing 
the social welfare of participating countries based on classical free trade theory. As obstacles to cross-
border trade are removed, the choice of potential counter-parties will be expanded and the number of 
transactions will rise. This will entail a more efficient allocation of factors of production (capital and 
labour) and ensure that products may circulate freely to where they are remunerated best. This virtuous 
circle relies on “private initiative in free markets,”88 and assumes that any additional cross-border 
transaction shall enhance the utility of participating parties. It thereby presupposes that individual 
market players are capable of perceiving and processing transaction relevant information, and of 
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making on such solid informational bases rational transaction decisions that actually meet their 
preferences.  
Thus, the role that has been assigned to the market players by the internal market rationale does indeed 
conceive the individual actor as “well-informed, observant and circumspect” as it has been stated by 
the ECJ. The accentuated role that has been attributed to the individual market player through the 
normative programme outlined in the internal market provisions of the Treaties is further reflected in 
the Court’s jurisprudence whereby these provisions “confer upon them rights which become part of 
their legal heritage.”89 Certainly, the outlined concept of internal market players does not exclude 
regulatory activities that may be characterized as market rational, i.e. for example rules that seek to 
ensure a sufficient informational basis for a transaction decision. The assigned role only presupposes 
that the individual may be empowered with the help of such assisting rules to reach transaction 
decisions that meet their preferences and enhance their individual utility.  
Such a concept on the one hand grants market players the freedom to make autonomous decisions, but 
on the other hand also demands such autonomous decision-making and in this regard even expects a 
learning process from them.90 This assumes that market participants who suffer material disadvantages 
as they neglect available information or who regret certain transactions because they had not carefully 
evaluated enough their preferences at the outset, shall benefit from such an experience and shall in 
future act more responsibly and clever on the market. The idea of such successful learning processes 
forms a classical justification of preference autonomy and personal responsibility as normative 
principles.91 Consequently, fundamental freedoms such as the essential market integrative tools have 
been interpreted as instruments that extend party autonomy across borders.92 Hence, the internal 
market concept as enshrined in the Treaties is basically hostile towards paternalistic content-oriented, 
market-rectifying93 regulatory activities that seek to actively steer transaction decisions in a certain 
direction. It conflicts with an image of internal market players as individuals whose transaction 
decisions should be actively controlled by regulation as they suffer from cognitive deficits and from 
the effects of bounded rationality and therefore are considered incapable of responsible market 
activities in accordance with their own interest. 
Normative Requirements to Consider Individual Weaknesses, Cognitive Deficits, and Effects of 
Bounded Rationality 
The concept of the internal market player as a “smart and decent fellow” as sketched above rests only 
on one – though the most essential – dimension of the normative framework of internal market 
regulation. Yet it neglects that EU primary law does not only attribute an economic function and 
market-related rights to the individuals that are subject to regulatory acts of the Union. Rather these 
individuals are woven into a more complex normative network of rights and duties particularly as they 
have had fundamental rights and the status of European citizens conferred upon them. We will argue 
that it is the fundamental-rights dimension that accounts for the fact that internal market regulation is 
at least partly characterized by a consideration of individual weaknesses, cognitive deficits, and 
exceptionally even shows an openly paternalistic facet as illustrated by the regulation on the labelling 
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of tobacco products. This raises the question whether the normative framework even demands a more 
pronounced “behavioural turn” whereby regulatory activity has to focus even more on the effects of 
bounded rationality, seeking to cure “behavioural deficits,” and steering the behaviour of market 
players in their own best interest.  
On the impact of fundamental rights on the regulatory concept of internal market players 
The market-player concept of internal market regulation largely relies on the market integrating 
function as it is embodied in the fundamental freedoms. It is indeed convincing to take their rationale 
as a starting point to evaluate the market-player concept.  
However, during the last few years the ECJ has attributed a significant role to fundamental rights also 
in the context of the application of fundamental freedoms. As the Court highlighted in “Carpenter,” 
fundamental rights safeguard activities and interests such as a functioning family life that in fact have 
to be considered “conditions” under which fundamental freedoms may be exercised.94 Hence, as 
“Carpenter” illustrates, the exercise of fundamental freedoms should be considered as being embedded 
in a normative framework set up by fundamental rights.  
Further implications of these findings were illustrated by the ECJ’s judgments in “Schmidberger,” and 
subsequently confirmed inter alia in “Viking” and “Laval” where the Court held that fundamental 
rights may justify a restriction of fundamental freedoms.95 Accordingly, if measures that implement 
the integration of the internal market restrict fundamental rights, the weight of the restriction of these 
fundamental rights has to be balanced against the weight of the general interest in a functioning 
internal market and the individual rights conferred by fundamental freedoms as recognized in “van 
Gend en Loos.”96 Viewed from the perspective of the internal market legislature, fundamental rights 
turn into duties to protect the individuals as they are affected by activities in exercise of fundamental 
freedoms, and which require the European legislature to strike a balance when acting as a regulator. 
This development reflects previous suggestions to attribute a horizontal effect to fundamental rights 
under EU law.97 
Hence, individual weaknesses, cognitive constraints and the effects of bounded rationality must not be 
ignored per se in the context of internal market regulation, but instead need to be taken into account 
according to the requirements set by fundamental rights, and have to be balanced against the rights 
resulting from fundamental freedoms. It is this aspect that explains why internal market regulation 
does not follow the illustrated stylized information paradigm, but also aims at protecting particularly 
vulnerable market players, seeks to facilitate information processing, and partly even seeks to steer the 
process of decision-making in a certain direction. And as the European institutions are obliged to 
protect the mental and physical integrity of persons,98 it is consistent that the ECJ, while it has adopted 
the concept of a well-informed, observant and circumspect” consumer in its adjudication regarding 
deceptive marketing practices, does apply a more protective standard when a marketing activity entails 
                                                     
94 ECJ, 11 July 2002, Case C-60/00, Mary Carpenter v Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2002] ECR I-6279, 
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the risk that a misapprehension on the part of an addressee poses not just financial but health risks to 
that individual.99 This is essentially why Union consumer law has always followed a double-headed 
approach, aiming primarily at the establishment of an internal market but at the same time striving for 
protective goals.100 
This raises the question as to normative guidelines set out by EU law on how the balancing between 
the fundamental freedoms’ impetus to grant greater freedom for economic activities and the protective 
goal pursued through fundamental rights should be accomplished. In “Schmidberger” the ECJ granted 
the lawmaker a “wide margin of discretion” in this regard.101 Thus, it seems reasonable to suppose that 
the legislature also enjoys a margin of discretion when it has to decide to what extent it relies on the 
normative concept of the internal market player as a “smart and decent fellow” with regard to 
regulatory measures that secure the exercising of fundamental freedoms and the functioning of the 
internal market, and to what extent such regulatory activities have to be guided by a protective impetus 
required by fundamental rights.  
However, in other cases the ECJ stipulated more specific instructions as to this regulatory balancing 
task. In “Affish” the Court stated that whenever a contested decision is intended to guarantee the 
protection of public health “it must take precedence over economic considerations.”102 Such a finding 
is supported by Article 168(1) TFEU, whereby a “high level of human health protection shall be 
ensured in the definition and implementation of all Union policies and activities,” and by Article 
114(3) TFEU, according to which the Commission has to take a high level of health into account when 
proposing measures under Article 114(1) TFEU. While the wording of the provisions in question 
suggests a distinction between public and individual health issues, this seems to be – at least in our 
context – of no significance. As the protection of individual health and the protection of public health 
are partly associated with different competence regimes,103 both may be conceptually distinguished. 
However, the ECJ has implicitly assumed that policy choices for public health protection are 
intertwined with human health protection and may therefore be referred to interchangeably.104 The 
Treaty also reflects this view as “human health” in Article 168(1) TFEU is stipulated as part of Title 
XIV “public health.”  
Neither Article 168(1) TFEU nor Article 114(3) TFEU provide for a competence norm, hence no duty 
can be imposed on the EU institutions to implement pro-health regulation. One may nonetheless 
deduce the following aspect from the rationale of “Affish” reading it together with Article 168(1) 
TFEU and Article 114(3) TFEU: When EU institutions conduct a balancing test and thereby consider 
concerns of public health in an internal market context, this aspect shall prevail over a concept that is 
solely based on an impetus to expand the freedom for economic activities in the interest of internal 
market integration. Thus, under such circumstances the normative image of an internal market player 
as a “smart and decent fellow” has to be modified accordingly, i.e. individual weaknesses, cognitive 
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defects etc. that give reason to fear that market activities might entail risks of health damage must not 
be ignored based on an internal market rationale or an information paradigm in a pure form.  
The implementation of citizenship rights and its impact on the concept of an internal market player 
In 1992 the Member States introduced provisions on a “Citizenship of the Union” through the 
Maastricht Treaty. These provisions confer upon any person holding the nationality of a Member State 
inter alia the individual right to move and reside freely within the Union’s territory,105 and the 
political right to take part in elections to the European Parliament and to municipal elections in their 
Member State of residence.106 Beyond those rights which are expressly mentioned in the citizenship 
provisions107 the concept of an EU citizenship has to be understood as a label for the bundle of rights 
that are conferred upon the nationals of EU Member States in the Treaties.108 As such the concept 
signals that EU law conceives individuals not only instrumentally, i.e. restricted to their “function” as 
producers or consumers of goods and services or as providers of capital or even as a mere factor of 
production (“labour”). Rather, the aggrandisement of the diverse individual rights through their 
bundling under the status of an EU citizenship recognizes individual human beings beyond their role 
as economic actors also as participants in the political sphere and as individuals with social needs.  
While acknowledging this rationale of the implementation of the status of a “Citizenship of the 
Union,” it still remains unclear to what extend EU citizenship as a legal concept does effectively grant 
broader rights to individuals beyond those which are expressly mentioned in Articles 20 to 24 TFEU 
or which are already embodied in the primary or secondary law of the Union.109 The ECJ has referred 
to Union citizenship in cases where it sought to substantiate an application of the principle of non-
discrimination on grounds of nationality (Article 18 TFEU) to grant persons a right of access to social 
benefits without referring to their role as economic actors, e.g. in the cases of students110 or job-
seekers.111 
However, while the concept of an EU citizenship points to the fact that EU law not only recognizes the 
individual isolated in its economic function, it is hard to see how EU citizenship – at least as it stands 
now in its character as a legal concept  – could raise conflicts with a certain construction of internal 
market regulation or in particular of the fundamental freedoms beyond those conflicts that are already 
provoked by the application of fundamental rights (that are, certainly, also bundled under the “label” 
of EU citizenship). Though the rationale of EU citizenship may almost certainly be associated with a 
normative assignment to ensure that “the economic law provisions are interpreted with due respect for 
the dignity of the persons,”112 the mechanism at work resembles the impact of fundamental rights we 
have seen in “Carpenter,” but it misses the conflicting dimension we have seen with regard to 
fundamental rights e.g. in “Schmidberger,” “Viking” or “Laval”. As illustrated by these cases, the 
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recognition of fundamental rights may provoke direct conflicts with the impetus of internal market law 
to expand economic freedom for market actors across borders, and which therefore entails the need for 
a balancing of opposing rights and interests. In contrast, social or political rights that are established 
through the principle of non-discrimination construed and strengthened in the light of EU citizenship 
seem to add a different but not conflicting dimension to a pure economic and market-oriented 
perspective.   
Thus, “Citizenship of the Union” as a legal status represents an allocation of not only economic but 
also of political and social rights to Member States’ citizens and thereby illustrates that EU law 
conceives persons not only restricted to their economic “function.” However, the concept of the EU 
citizen must still be seen through the rationale of EU law. The social and political facet of the concept 
of EU citizenship therefore does not resemble a new, transformed or other form of nation-state 
citizens, but rather “corresponds to the set of rights granted to individuals as participants and 
beneficiaries of economic integration.”113 In this sense, it implements additional but not conflicting 
normative aspects of internal market integration since these additional requirements stem from the 
benefits of economic integration achieved inter alia by economic regulation. Hence, economic 
integration and the regulation aiming at this end form the basis of EU citizenship rather than the other 
way round.114  
Therefore, with regard to our topic we may conclude that from EU citizenship in its legal effect 
beyond the relevance of the bundled rights and duties, one may not deduce normative guidance on the 
shape of economic regulation, particularly as to the question to what extent EU law demands or allows 
for a normative concept based on a consciously exaggerated assumption of the individual’s capability 
to perceive and process information and of rational decision-making, or rather to what extent it 
requires the consideration of individual weaknesses, cognitive restraints, or the effects of bounded 
rationality. 
Article 114 TFEU as the pivotal competence norm for internal market regulation 
The European Union has only the powers the Member States specifically conferred on it in the 
Treaties (Article 5(2) TEU). Thus, the Union has no general power of market regulation. As it is laid 
down in Article 114(1) TFEU by reference to Article 26 TFEU, and as it has been emphasized by the 
Court, the European legislature must ensure that any regulatory measure enacted on the basis of 
Article 114 TFEU as the pivotal competence norm for internal market legislation “must genuinely 
have as its object the improvement of the conditions for the establishment and functioning of the 
internal market.”115  
Beyond that, Article 114(1) TFEU does not contain any substantive guideline on the harmonizing 
measures for which it provides the legal basis. However, Article 114(1) TFEU must not be read in 
isolation, but in connection with certain qualifications. According to Article 114(3) TFEU the 
European Commission when it envisages a proposal on a harmonization of national regulation based 
on Article 114(1) TFEU relating to health, safety, environmental protection, and consumer protection 
has to take “as a base a high level of protection.” In addition, the European Parliament and the Council 
shall also “seek to achieve these objectives.”  
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While it has been remarked that this wording does not compel the EU institutions to enact measures in 
accordance with a high level of protection,116 Article 114(3) TFEU certainly does not only contain a 
general appeal for political consideration of those protective goals. Rather it has to be understood as a 
binding normative guideline that at least prevents the EU legislature from ignoring the mentioned non-
economic objectives or from harmonizing protective standards at the lowest conceivable level. In this 
respect, Article 114(3) TFEU reflects normative requirements that are laid down elsewhere in EU 
primary law, for instance in horizontal clauses such as Article 11 TFEU concerning environmental 
protection and Article 12 TFEU concerning consumer protection. Thus, Article 114(3) TFEU takes 
away from the European legislature the option to generally neglect any individual weaknesses, 
cognitive constraints etc. of market players, such as, for example, by adopting a stylized information 
paradigm as indicated above that imposes the burden of perceiving and processing information and 
reaching a rational transaction decision completely upon each individual market player.  
This raises the question if contrariwise Article 114(3) TFEU forces the internal market legislature to 
fully take into account individual defects and weaknesses that are revealed by behavioural sciences 
(“taking account in particular of any new development based on scientific facts”) and excludes the 
option of adopting a normative concept of internal market players that at least to some extent neglects 
those insights. Does Article 114(3) TFEU in fact require a “behavioural turn” in internal market 
regulation, understood as a significant expansion of regulatory interventions based on an impetus to 
influence market players’ conduct in a paternalistic way?  
We may answer this in the negative as such an understanding and implementation of Article 114 
TFEU would in fact result in the harmonizing of regulation at the highest conceivable level of 
protection. Such an approach would – to take up again the argument of Advocate General Capotorti in 
“Cassis de Dijon”117 – ultimately amount to a prescription of uniform products. However, if internal 
market regulation were to put an end to the diversity of products available on the internal market, it 
would in fact eliminate an essential purpose of its concept, namely to open markets to enrich all 
internal market players with a greater variety of products, thereby better serving the diverse interests 
of market players. Article 114 TFEU neither legitimizes, nor does it demand regulatory measures with 
such counterproductive effects on internal market integration as it is the internal market rationale that 
forms the basis for any regulatory measure in the first place.118   
Hence, what Article 114 TFEU calls for is a balancing between a promotion of the functioning of the 
internal market as the prior ambition of any regulatory measure adopted on that basis, and a protection 
of those interests mentioned in Article 114(3) TFEU. Taking a look at the concept of man in economic 
regulation, in particular the requirement to consider concerns of health, (product) safety, and consumer 
protection may be of relevance. However, the internal market legislature enjoys a wide margin of 
discretion in performing this balancing assignment.119 In search of normative guidance for an exercise 
of this discretionary power one may refer in particular to the provisions on fundamental rights. 
Therefore, regulatory measures concerning the protection of the physical integrity of market players 
(“health”, (product) “safety”) should tend to be characterized by a relatively higher protective standard 
than measures that are only related to the pure financial interests of market players. 
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To sum up briefly, Article 114 TFEU neither allows internal market regulation to completely neglect 
individual weaknesses, cognitive restraints etc. and to impose, for example, the informational burden 
completely upon each individual market player, nor does it require a “behavioural turn” from the EU 
legislature, i.e. a focus on regulatory measures that aim at countering effects of bounded rationality 
etc. Rather, Article 114 TFEU demands from the legislature that it balances the objective interest in 
establishing a functional internal market that entails a tendency towards a lower degree of regulatory 
intervention with the protective purposes laid down in Article 114(3) TFEU. The EU institutions 
thereby enjoy a wide margin of discretion. 
Regulatory Consideration of Concerns of Behavioural Sciences: Some Sceptical 
Remarks 
EU law provides for a normative basis that legitimizes or to some extent even demands that the 
legislature considers in issuing economic regulation also the individual weaknesses, cognitive limits 
and biases of market actors as well as the potential effects of bounded rationality. Yet we have also 
seen that the decision for such regulatory intervention and the way it is implemented remain largely at 
the discretion of the legislature.  
Any kind of regulatory intervention faces a number of obstacles along its way to successful 
implementation,120 and regulatory ambitions in response to individual cognitive and behavioural 
deficits constitute no exception in this regard. It is in the nature of regulation that it requires the 
lawmaker to find a standardized protective level that applies for all addressees,121 in the case of 
internal market regulation across Europe. But risk perception is different among people and cultures, 
and it may change without there being observable patterns.122 A centralized rule-making in Brussels 
that produces harmonized economic regulation may in particular not account for heterogeneous 
preferences that are influenced by quite strong divergent cultural and social backgrounds throughout 
the Union. Persuasion, acceptance, and ultimately the effects of such regulatory measures will 
accordingly vary to a high degree, and therefore such regulation bears significant risks of being 
ineffective and inefficient or even of producing counter-productive results and undesired side-effects.  
A negative long-term effect that has particularly been associated with a “behavioural universe” is that 
market actors “don’t learn much” where regulation does not expect learning processes from 
individuals in their role as market participants but seeks to steer their behaviour in the “right” direction 
from the outset.123 Thus, regulation with a “behavioural impetus” risks decreasing the capacity of self-
control, phasing out the possibility to let market players become confident market actors who learn 
from their positive and negative experiences.124 Market players whose conduct have constantly been 
influenced by regulation that aims at counteracting cognitive biases and effects of bounded rationality, 
will ultimately become more and more dependent on regulation as they may no longer be able to take 
responsibility for matters regarding their own welfare. There seems to be a risk that regulation which 
attempts behaviour modification might result in a regulatory spiral, confirming its own legitimacy, and 
even creating a need for constantly stronger regulatory interventions.125  
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Potential impediments to an effective implementation of a regulatory concept that seeks to counter 
cognitive biases and the effects of bounded rationality, as well as likely counter-productive effects and 
negative side-effects have to be taken into account by European institutions when they define the 
protective standard of a harmonizing measure, and when they balance individual rights to free trade 
and the objective interest in a functioning internal market on the one hand with the objective to 
prohibit a race to the bottom in pursuing certain protective purposes on the other. A call for regulatory 
intervention must not become a sort of knee-jerk reaction to results of behavioural sciences. 
Regulators are encouraged not to take these findings as a welcome excuse to expand their field of 
activities, as a justification to optimize rules that are supposed to counter market failures or to 
implement market-rectifying intervention. Rather they should consider conceiving those insights as a 
cause for lowering regulatory ambitions to a realistic level.126 
Conclusion 
(1) The economic rationale behind the legal concept of an internal market rests upon classical free 
trade theory as it aims at an enhancement of allocative efficiency through removing barriers of cross-
border trade. Yet functioning markets also require positive economic regulation, for example 
regulation that counters the risks of adverse selection due to systematic information deficits. The 
ECJ’s decision in “Cassis de Dijon” reflects a potential trade-off between the liberalizing impetus of 
internal market regulation and the protective objectives pursued by economic regulation, be it of 
domestic or EU law origin: the stricter the level of the latter, the more the diversity of products 
available in the internal market as well as the flexibility of production factors will be reduced.  
(2) Therefore, the fundamental freedoms subject the implementation of positive protective goals 
through economic regulation to a proportionality test on the basis of which the Court developed inter 
alia the normative concept of an internal market consumer as “reasonably well-informed and 
reasonably observant and circumspect.” This concept implied that for reasons of internal market 
benefits, market players have (at least to some extent) to bear the burden of perceiving and processing 
information that is transaction relevant as well as disadvantages should they be ill-equipped to cope 
with this assignment. The internal market legislature echoed this concept of internal market actors as it 
explicitly referred to it in secondary legislation but also as it implemented a preference for giving 
market actors free access to information over content related regulation.  
(3) EU institutions have never adopted a normative market player concept solely guided by the 
liberalizing rationale of internal market law. In particular, the Court stated exceptions in circumstances 
where misconceptions on the part of consumers posed health risks, and various examples illustrate 
how the EU legislature assists market players in perceiving and processing information and even seeks 
to steer their decision-making process in a certain direction. In this respect, a clear-cut distinction is 
not possible as there is nothing like a purely informational but content-neutral rule since every 
regulatory choice as to which information has to be provided on the market and in which form 
involves an element of paternalism as it influences the informational basis that may establish the 
ground for the decision-making process of market players. Thus, any rule that is meant to facilitate 
perceiving and processing information contains a “behavioural facet,” if only implicitly or as a matter 
of fact, and weak in its nature. In contrast, only exceptionally internal market regulation reveals 
paternalism in a strong form, i.e. instances where the internal market legislature conceived the 
individual addressees of its economic regulation as inapt to a market conduct that served their own 
best interest due to cognitive biases or effects of bounded rationality. Thus, looking at positive internal 
market law no “behavioural turn” may be diagnosed. 
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(4) Internal market regulation and the normative market player concept embodied therein are the result 
of a balancing assignment attributed to the internal market legislature by EU primary law. It is 
essentially fundamental rights that may oblige regulators to take into account individual weaknesses, 
cognitive limits and biases as well as the effects of bounded rationality as revealed by insights of 
behavioural sciences. Therefore, the internal market legislature must not take an optimization of 
allocative efficiency according to the free trade rationale enshrined particularly in the fundamental 
freedom as its sole guidance for economic regulation. Yet normative requirements as they follow from 
the fundamental rights and as they are also reflected in Article 114(3) TFEU neither demand nor 
legitimize a “behavioural turn,” i.e. a change in the policy of internal market regulation according to 
which an impetus to actively steer market players’ conduct in their own best interest should become an 
essential ambition. Such a paternalistic shift in regulatory policy would conflict with the internal 
market rationale that only grants the regulatory competence to EU institutions in the first place, which, 
however, enjoy a wide margin of discretion in this regard.  

  
 
 
